States levy insurance premium taxes, which are essentially gross receipt taxes on premiums, with insurance companies paying the higher of the tax rate in the state in which the company is domiciled and the state in which the policy is written. Using a state-level panel data set from 1992-2004 for the property-casualty insurance industry, we explore the effect of the effective insurance premium tax rates on state employment related to the insurance industry. We estimate both a static model and a dynamic adjustment model. We find that the insurance premium tax has a negative but modest effect on employment in the insurance industry.
Introduction
The insurance industry offers a unique opportunity to investigate the effect of taxes on economic development. The literature on the effect of taxation on employment and business location is quite large. For example, Wasylenko's (1997) review referenced almost 100 articles, but Bartik (1991) points out several methodological and data problems with the literature, including the complexity of the business location decision, the durability of capital and agglomerations economies that imply a slow adjustment process, the difficulty in measuring variables such as wages and tax rates, the nonobservability of the geographic characteristics of the unit being considered, and endogeneity. This paper offers several advantages over the existing literature in terms of these issues.
First, we focus on a specific sector of the insurance industry, namely the propertycasualty industry. One of the difficulties with many of the existing studies is that they focus on the relationship between the corporate or individual income tax and employment in a state across all industries. This is problematic for several reasons, but in particular, since not all industries are structured similarly, they may react differently to changes in the tax structure. This can lead to weak and contradictory analytic results. Focusing on one industry ameliorates many of these issues.
Second, both individual and corporate income taxes are complex and vary greatly in their application across states. Thus, modeling these taxes correctly, and properly accounting for factors such as apportionment of corporate income is challenging and requires more data than is generally available to fully account for these factors. While these studies test for the effect of taxes, many different measures of taxes or tax rates are used, e.g., taxes per capita or per dollar of income, tax capacity, tax effort, and nominal tax rates. Few studies use effective tax rates. Our data allow us to construct effective tax rates which take into account the various provisions of the tax on insurance companies.
Third, because we are focusing on one industry we can account for differences in labor costs more accurately. To reflect labor cost differences across states we measure the wage rate using actual wages for a particular occupation within the insurance industry.
Fourth, unlike many of the existing studies, we include controls for public service expenditures, and finally, because we use a panel data set we can include state and time fixed effects to control for endogeneity.
The advantage of considering the effect of taxes on the location of insurance industry jobs is that the insurance premium tax is a relatively simple tax to model and is not subject to apportionment. In addition, the effect of the tax is limited to insurance companies, which greatly reduces the level of diversity in the dataset. These two factors should allow the effect of taxes on the industry to be measured in a much more direct manner than in other studies and should lead to a greater confidence in the final results.
In anticipation of the results, we find that the effective insurance premium tax rate on property-casualty insurance companies has a negative effect on state-level employment in the insurance industry. We calculate for each state for each year for the period 1992-2004 the effective tax rate on premiums written by domestic insurers and on premiums written by foreign insurers (see below for a discussion of domestic tax rate and foreign tax rate). In the static model, the coefficients on both tax rate variables are negative and statistically significant. Furthermore, the coefficient on the foreign tax rate is larger than the coefficient on the domestic tax rate, as expected. The elasticity between per capita employment in the insurance industry and the domestic tax rate is -0.046, and is -0.092 with respect to the foreign tax rate. These results imply that a 10 percent change in the tax rate (2.22 to 2.42 percent) translates into approximately 39 lost jobs for a change in the domestic rate and 78 lost jobs for a change in the foreign company rate for the average state. We also estimate a long-run dynamic adjustment model. We find that the only significant effect is from the domestic tax rate as the foreign tax rate seems to have no significant long run effect on employment. We obtain a long run elasticity for the domestic rate of -0.070 which given a ten percent change in the domestic tax rate corresponds to a long-run loss in employment of 64 jobs in the average state.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section the insurance premium tax is described and the relevant literature discussed. Section 3 discusses our empirical approach to the issue. Section 4 is a discussion of the data used, and section 5 presents the empirical results. Concluding comments finish the paper.
Taxes on Insurance Premiums
All insurance companies writing policies in a state are taxed on the value of premiums written in that state, and in general are not subject to the state corporate income tax.
1 The premium tax is levied as a fixed percentage of the value of the premiums written in the state less a deduction for any premiums returned or dividends paid to the 1 Neubig and Vlaisavljevich (1992) provide a thorough review of the non-federal taxes facing insurance companies. While insurance premium tax rates are in the 2.5 percent range, Neubig, et al. (2002) Retaliatory taxes are discriminatory taxes imposed on insurance providers chartered in states with higher premium tax rates than in the state from which it collects premiums. All states except Hawaii impose retaliatory taxes. 6 In practice, the retaliatory tax penalizes companies from high tax states. A company thus pays the higher of the premium tax in the state in which the insurance policy is written and the state in which the company is domiciled. For instance, if a Tennessee company, which faces a domestic premium tax rate of 2.50 percent, writes a policy in Georgia, which has a total premium tax of 4.75 percent, then the company faces a premium tax of 4.75 percent on the policies 2 While almost every state has the premium tax, some have both a premium tax and an income tax. However, because the premium tax is always greater than then income tax (and the income tax is creditable against the premium tax), in this paper we refer to the premium tax as the method of taxing the insurance industry.
3 Congress granted the states broad authority to tax and regulate the insurance industry free from typical commerce power restrictions in the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945. See e.g. Kimball and Boyce (1958) for a description of the law and how it affected insurance regulation. 7 Georgia has a state premium tax rate of 2.25 percent and a local premium tax rate of 2.5 percent, for a total of 4.75 percent.
There has been little written on the economic effects of taxes as they relate specifically to the insurance industry. Wheaton (1986) considers the impact of state taxes on the asset growth rates of the 77 largest life insurance companies in the country. He regressed company growth in assets over the 1966-1981 period against the effective tax rate a set of control variables, and finds a consistently negative and significant coefficient for the effective state tax rate. While the results indicate a fairly small effect, a $10 million increase in tax liability decreases company growth by 0.9 percent, the effect is statistically significant. Petroni and Shackelford (1995) consider the effect of state premium taxes and regulation on the choice of organizational form of property and casualty insurers. They find that higher insurance premium tax rates and regulatory burdens significantly lower the numbers of domesticated insurance companies or a lower percentage of insurance premiums sold by domestic insurers. In addition, Ke, et al. (2000) find that increases in taxes on premiums of non-automobile lines of insurance increase self-insurance in a state.
Empirical Methodology
We start by assuming that employment in the insurance industry in each state is in equilibrium, and that equilibrium employment depends on factors that reflect demand and cost. Our regression model includes the effective domestic and foreign tax rates on insurance premiums, a set of variables that reflect the size of the insurance market in each state and relevant costs in each state, and state and time fixed effects. The state fixed effects control for state-specific differences in climate, raw materials, presence of metropolitan areas, and other factors that can cause output differences across states, and the time fixed effects control for time-specific, nationwide factors such as the business cycle, population, federal fiscal and monetary policy. The regression model is given by
where E ts is a measure of employment in the insurance industry in state s in year t, T D and T F are the effective domestic and foreign insurance premium tax rates, X is a set of variables measuring size of the market and cost factors, v is a set of fixed state dummies, µ is a set of fixed time dummies, and ε is an error term. We estimate equation 3 using OLS and GLS but report only the OLS as the results are substantially similar. In addition,
we employed lagged variables for the tax rates and found similar results.
It is possible that employment may not fully adjust to changes in the independent variables. Helms ( 
In equation 5, however, the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term ε.
We follow Anderson and Hsiao's (1982) instrumental variable estimator procedure to eliminate the correlation. 8 First, the model is transformed into first differences to eliminate the state-specific term vs. Second, the resulting equation is estimated using two-stage least squares where E st-2 and E st-3 are used as instruments for (E st-1 -E st-2 ).
Data
Our data consists of a panel for the 50 states for each year 1992 to 2004. Our focus in this paper is on the property-casualty insurance industry, in part, because it is possible to obtain information about the taxes paid by each insurer writing insurance in a state for this industry. 9 Over the time period of the sample there were a number (17) of state outliers. We excluded them if the effective domestic rate was greater than the 95 percentile of the distribution of the domestic tax rate. Most of the exclusions we believe are necessary because of specific states tax policies enacted to address short-term problems in the state. For example, Utah currently taxes workers compensation premiums at 7.75 percent but in the past it has been as high as 9.75 percent. This has an effect of raising the effective rate for the state. While the property and liability insurance industry is relatively homogenous and taxed in a similar way, we exclude Utah because of its particular tax policy on workers compensation. To test the robustness of these exclusions we also estimated the regressions using a "winsorized" effective tax rate. A winsor transformation is one which replaces distribution outliers with the value of the distribution at a given percentile. Thus, if the tax rate was less than the 5th percentile of the distribution of tax rates, the tax rate is set to the value of the 5 th percentile. In addition, if the effective tax rate was greater than or equal to the 95 th percentile, we set the tax rate at the value of the 95 th percentile to reduce the effect of outliers. 10 The results of the winsorized regressions are essentially the same as the results of the regression where we eliminated state outliers.
States have different tax policies for foreign and domestic companies that lead to differences in tax rates between domestic and foreign companies. These differences in tax polices toward domestic and foreign companies can be as simple as a rate difference or a subtle as differences in credits. For example, Georgia nominally has the same tax rate for foreign and domestic companies, but it provides a lower rate for those companies that invest 75 percent of their assets in the state. Domestic companies are more likely to be able to invest 75 percent of their assets within the state to obtain a significant reduction in the tax rate than would foreign companies. This is, in part, because in Georgia local companies are relatively small and while there are some small foreign companies, most of the large ones would not be permitted (for prudential reasons) to invest 75 percent of their assets in any one state. The practice of applying different rates to foreign and domestic companies suggests that there is some possible rationale for using the insurance tax system to attract companies to the state. The important source of the difference between the effective tax rates is the retaliatory tax. Companies chartered in relatively high premium tax rate states will face a higher premium tax in relatively low tax environments. We have three main dependent variables. They are the employment in the property-casualty industry (excluding agents) in a state in a given year, the number of insurance agents employed in a state in a given year, and the share of national propertycasualty employment in a given state in a given year. These data come from the Bureau of the Census. The series for property-casualty employment is from the NAICS series bankrupt insurer has liabilities greater than its assets. In almost every state, the remaining insurers are assessed an amount based on market share to cover any shortfall caused by an insurer's bankruptcy. Some portion of this assessment each year is often deductible (or creditable) against the premium tax as a carryforward.
524126 and the insurance agents are from NAICS series 5242. One important item to note is that agents may sell property-casualty and/or life and health products. Thus, while the other data is solely from the property-casualty industry, the agent data has all insurance agents included in the category. Our priors are that the number of agents in a state is driven by the size of the insurance market in the state and not by the premium tax rate. Overall, we have a consistently defined series from 1992-2004. To control for the stringency of the state's regulatory environment we employ an indicator variable for whether the state regulates price changes with "prior approval" or allows companies to set prices subject to an ex post oversight of rates. Prior approval states require that the insurer submit its rates for approval from the regulator prior to their use in policy contracts. This prior approval indicator variable comes from Harrington (2002) and is a crude but commonly employed variable to describe the state's regulatory environment. We have no a prior hypothesis regarding the direction of the effect of regulation on employment. It could be that strict regulation reduces the output of insurers and this reduces the demand for labor. Or, it could be that strict regulation increases employment in order to better comply with the state's regulations.
To reflect cost differences across states we use the state average wage for insurance agents, obtained from BLS Wages and Salaries series on wages by area and occupation. We use this variable instead of wages from property-casualty insurance industry since some states have no domestic companies and thus no reported average wage for the industry.
Finally, we include a set of fiscal variables obtained from the Bureau of the Census, including state public expenditure on selected services and measures of property tax and sales tax burdens. We include education expenses per one million population, transportation expenditures per one million population, welfare expenditures per one million population, and medical expenditure per one million population. We also include as control variables sales taxes per million dollars of personal income and property taxes per million population. To account for the fact that the states' two tax rates are correlated (ρ =0.16), we also ran the regression in Table 2 dropping the domestic tax rate from the estimation.
Results

Effects for Static Model
The coefficient on the foreign tax rate for that regression is somewhat larger (-6.361) and is still statistically significant.
We included several variables to control for the composition of the propertycasualty insurance industry, only two of which are statistically significant. The number of domestic property-casualty firms in the state is positively related to employment per capita, but the coefficient has a very large standard error. This result is consistent with the positive sign on the coefficient for the share of the market (premiums written) held by domestic firms. But again, the coefficient is not statistically significant. The coefficient on the number of foreign property-casualty firms which write policies in the state is negative and statistically significant. If there is a large number of foreign firms this implies that much of the foreign firms' employment is in other states. Thus, the greater the number of foreign firms the less the domestic demand for insurance labor. Finally, the negative coefficients on the domestic market share of multistate property-casualty firms and the market share of the largest firm are consistent with larger firms having fewer employees relative to premiums written.
13
13 We also estimated regressions in which various combinations of these industry variables were excluded.
We found that when the three market share variables (multi state market share, market share of the largest company within the state, and the domestic market share) were included in the regression all three were significant (or nearly so), but when one or two were left out the standard errors increased. It appears that
We see that the average agent wage is negatively associated with per capita employment. This is to be expected as the higher labor costs would reduce the quantity of labor demanded, all other things equal. In addition, we see that a strict regulator environment is associated with lower employment within the state.
Finally, we also included several state-level fiscal variables. Generally these variables did not perform as expected, based on the findings in other studies. The coefficients on the property and sales tax variables are both positive, which is contrary to expectation, but not significant. We expected the coefficient on the education and transportation expenditure variables to be positive, but both are negative. shift to those states with lower tax rates, all other things held constant. The coefficients on both of the two tax policy variables, the domestic and foreign tax rates, are negative, but only the coefficient on the foreign tax rate is statistically significant, and that at the 7 percent level with a two-tail test. One interesting negative result is that states had historically believed that they could keep foreign companies out by having a high tax rate. This was the real rationale in setting a discriminatory tax on foreign insurers. Our results in Table 4 suggest that there is a negative relationship between the share of employment in a state and the foreign tax rate. The result suggests these discriminatory policies could reduce the share of employment in the industry in the discriminatory state.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Metropolitan v. Ward invalidated these overt discriminatory taxes in 1985 just prior to the beginning of our data. Thus, the effects of overt discrimination are no longer significant at standard levels, but there is some weak evidence that the discriminatory policy reduced the share of employment in a state. Most of the coefficients on the other variables have the same signs and are significant as in Table 2 . Table 5 shows the results of the fixed effects regression where we employ per capita premiums as the dependant variable. Obviously this is not an employment variable, but it is included to provide some additional evidence on how taxes affect the state market for property-casualty insurance. We would expect that higher domestic or foreign tax rates will reduce the volume of premiums written in the state, and the empirical results for the foreign rate are consistent with this expectation. However, for the domestic rate we see that there is a positive relationship between the rate and the premiums per 1000 in population. We examined a number of different specifications (including various interaction and quadratic terms) and the results seem robust. As a final robustness test we examined the difference between the foreign and domestic rates. This is shown in Model 2 of Table 5 . Essentially this is a test of the effect of the difference in the tax rates holding the domestic rate constant. We now see the domestic rate is negatively related as is the foreign rate. Thus, for premiums per capita it is the effect of the difference in rates that seems to matter rather than the absolute level of the rates.
The elasticity for the domestic rate is very small in Model 2 (-0.32), but is larger than for the difference in foreign tax and domestic rates (-0.017). This result suggests that at least part of the effect of the tax rate on employment works through the reduction in premiums written. The result is also consistent with Ke, et al. (2000) .
Effects from Dynamic Adjustment Model
We estimate the long-run elasticities between employment and tax rates by estimating a dynamic panel model shown in equation [3] using the Anderson-Hsiao approach modified by Arellano (1989) . The results for employment per capita are shown in Table 6 . The coefficient on the first difference of the domestic premium tax rate is negative and significant. This implies an increase in the domestic rate has a long run negative effect on insurance employment per capita. The elasticity for the domestic tax rate is calculated as -0.07. 15 This translates into a loss of approximately 64 jobs in the average state for a 10 percent increase in the domestic premium tax. In contrast, the coefficient on the foreign tax rate is positive but insignificant. The fact that the foreign rate was insignificant is different from our results in Table 2 . We attempted a number of different specifications to determine how robust the Table 6 results were. First, we estimated a similar model without the domestic rate and found the coefficient on the foreign tax rate was still positive and insignificant. Second, we hypothesized that because of prohibitions of overt discrimination between the foreign and domestic rates, the effect of the foreign rate might diminish over time. To test this we examined a similar model to that in Table 6 except we estimated it on two sub-samples. The first was for 1991-1997 and the second was for 1998-2004. We found that the domestic rate was significant and negative in both time periods, but the foreign rate was not significant in either period. However, we found that the foreign rate was measured with greater 15 We make a distinction between the elasticity of the first difference and that of the level. We report the elasticity as calculated by
where y is the dependent variable and t represents the tax rate. The bar superscript denote the average value of t and y.
precision in the earlier period than in the later period. This provides some minimal evidence that the foreign rate does not affect the long-run employment in the state.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper examines the effect of state taxation on employment in the propertycasualty industry, a well defined industry with significant firm specific tax and operational information provided by insurance regulators. Together with state data on employment for direct employees of the insurance companies as well as complementary information for insurance agents, we were able to examine the effect of state tax policy on employment. We were further able to break down the tax paid by domestic and foreign companies operating within a state. While the tax base is similar for the states (gross premiums written) and the statutory rate are in a similar range, there are differences in effective tax rates across states.
We find that state tax policy has a significant effect on employment. A 10 percent increase in the tax rate on domestic companies would decrease employment in the state by 64 jobs in the long run. In the short-run we found evidence that a 10 percent increase in the domestic rate would cause a loss of about 39 jobs while a similar increase in the effective foreign rate would cause a loss of 78 jobs.
The size of the employment changes appears relatively small. We undertook a number of robustness checks to see if the results changed. We employed other specifications of the domestic and foreign rates (i.e. the difference between the two rather than each separately). We also examined different specifications for the long-run dynamic panel and were not able to obtain different results.
Compared to studies of other industries, our estimates are small. It could be that the property-casualty insurance industry is simply less responsive to taxes than other industries. Since we have a well-defined industry and are able to measure the effective tax rate with high precision, our results could better reflect the effect of taxes on state employment than other studies.
One possible reason for the relatively small employment effect is that the demand for personal insurance is relatively inelastic. People are required to purchase homeowners insurance by their mortgage lenders. In addition, a minimum amount of automobile insurance is required by each state. By themselves, the homeowners and personal automobile market account for approximately 54 percent of the premiums written nationwide. Thus, if the demand for the insurance is inelastic, the effect on firm's labor decision is likely to be small as the policy owners bear the major incidence of the tax. However, firms still have profit incentives to operate in lower tax environments due to the operation of the retaliatory tax. 
